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PREFACE
This Working Paper initiates a series on research in
progress in the field of human adjustments to natural
hazards.

It is intended that these papers will be used as

working documents by the group of scholars directly
.

-

involved in hazard research as well as inform a larger
circle of interested persons.

The series is now being

supported from funds granted by the

u.s.

National Science

Foundation to the University of Chicago and Clark
University.

Authorship of papers is not necessarily

confined to those working at these institutions.
Further information about the research program is
available from the following:
Gilbert F. White,
Department of Geography,
University of Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois 60637,
U. S. A.
Robert W. Kates,
Graduate School of Geography,
Clark University,
Worcester, Massachusetts 01610,
U. S. A.
Ian Eurton,
Department of Geography,
University of Toronto,
Toronto 5, Ontario,
Canada.
Requests for copies of these papers and correspondence
relating directly thereto should be addressed to Toronto.

THE HUMAN ECOLOGY OF EXTREME GEOPHYSICAL EVENTS

A paradox is presented in man's apparently growing
susceptibility to injury from natural hazards during a
period of enlarged capacity to manipulate nature.

In many

countries flood control dams are repaying the capital
invested in their construction by preventing flood losses
that would otherwise have occurred; arid and semi-arid lands
are being made agriculturally productive by the provision of
irrigation water from canals and tube wells; snow removal
operations are increasingly effective and weather forecasting
has improved in reliability and length of range.

Nature

retreats on every hand and man, armed with a burgeoning
technology, is asserting his ecological dominance yet more
surely.
Nevertheless, in every month the mass media report in
dr~aatic

fashion the occurrence of natural disasters in

North America and around the world.

Within the recent past

a cyclone in East Pakistan, an earthquake in Turkey, and a
drought in southern Africa have demonstrated the perils
to which man is heir.

In fall 1966 floods in Florence were

responsible for much human suffering and for damage to
paintings, SCUlpture and books that constitute part of the
priceless heritage of western civilization.
An estimate of total losses from selected geophysical

hazards in the United States is given in Table 1.

These are
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Table 1
Estimates of average annual losses from selected geophysical
hazards in the United States.

Single year estimates are the

level of average losses current to year cited.

Property

damage figures are in millions of dollars unadjusted unless
otherwise noted.
HAZARD

No.

Floods

70

Loss of Life
Source
Period
1955-64

(1 )

Property Damage
Period Source
Amount
1000
350-1000
290

Hurricanes

110

1915-64

(1 )

250-500*
100
89

Tornadoes

194

1916-64

(1)

100-200*
40
300

Hail, wind and

125-250*

Thunderstorms

53

1966

(2 )

1964

(3 )

1955-64

(1)

1966

(4 )

1964

(3 )

1915-64

(1)

1966

(4)

1944-64

(1)

1967

( 5)

1966

(4)

1944-53

(6 )

1965

(1)

Lightening
Strikes and 160
Fire

1953-63

(1)

Earthquakes

3

1945-64

(1, 7)

15

1945-64 (1, 8)

18

1945-64

(1, 8)

9

1945-64 (1, 9)

Heat and
Isolation

238

1955-64

(10)

Cold

313

1955-64

(10 )

Tsunamis

TOTALS
*

1106
Insured losses only

100

621-2174
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the hazard extremes which cause marked human suffering and
social dislocation.

Annual average damage from all extreme

geophysical events LS probably between two and three billion
dollars a year (11).

Social costs seem to be mounting

rather than declining.
To understand this paradox it is necessary to examine
Ln ecological perspective the impacts of natural hazards upon
human society and the range of response to them.

Persistent

settlement and use of areas subject to recurrent natural
hazards has long excited the curiosity of geographers who
have noted that men return to rebuild their devastated
settlements in flood plains, on the slopes of volcanoes and
in zones of high earthquake activity, and who have recorded
the surging waves of success and failure in areas of scanty,
uncertain rainfall (12).

Awareness of the risk of repeated

disasters probably is hLgher in modern man, but the pattern
of reinvasion of hazard areas is no less than in the past,
and is very probably stronger.
While the research reported here has revealed many new
questions, it also has some slgnificant implications.

The

most serious of these is that mankind appears to be little
nearer the conquest of nature in its more violent and extreme
fluctuations.

Rather, the magnitude of the impact of rare

natural events upon society is increasing in terms of real
property damage and loss of life, although there is verbal
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reluctance to accept these costs.

This phenomenon may be

explained in simple terms by the continuing spread of man and
his works over greater areas of the earth's surface and his
presence in more places in greater numbers than before.

In

addition to the "real" increase in the impact of natural
hazards, the "apparent" increase is due to improved
communications which spread the news of the latest disaster
to more people more rapidly, and to an increasing expression
of intolerance for the vagaries of nature in an age of
powerful technology.

Natural hazar.ds become ·greater problems

in the minds of men as affluence spreads and as recognition
grows of a social resp6nsibility to cushion all members of a
society against unexpected hazards.
In a distinctive way the question of man's capacity to
shape a livelihood free from disruption by environmental
extremes draws together analysis of both physical and social
processes.

Over the past decade two distinct lines of

research have evolved,

One approach is exemplified by the

NAS-NRC disaster research group (13, 14, 15, 16) and the work
of the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University (17).
This work, mainly by behavioral scientists, apparently
developed in the search for analogs with nuclear disaster and
has been primarily concerned with human behavior during the
emergency period and under great stress.

This characteristic

distinguishes it from the second approach, illustrated by the
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research reported here, which has been concerned with the
long run persistence of settlement in hazard areas and with
associated attempts to regulate the hazards.
Recent investlgations of floods, drought and earthquake
suggest that much technological manipulation of environment
produces new hazards while ameliorating old ones, and that
effective design of social measures for coping with extreme
events calls for a sensitive understanding of natural
phenomena as altered by complex social relationships.

Such a

stance is consistent with one strain of geographic research
as outlined by Harlan H. Barrows who saw geography as human
ecology or the study of the adjustment of man to his
environment (18).

From that viewpoint man interferes with

the complex systems of air, water, soil and life that surround
him, and seeks to isolate himself from many aspects of the
natural world, to reconstruct others, and to adjust in varied
ways to the rhythms and discontinuities of the resulting
environment.

In studying these interactions, it may be

helpful to combine an anthropocentric notion of ecological
human dominance with a normative concern for understanding
the implications of human actions and taking responsibility
for them.

This normative concern is tempered by the

hypothesis that man, while capable of powerful actions,
possesses severe and shifting limits on both his ability to
perceive and understand the world around him and to choose
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among appropriate courses of action (19).

These limitations,

arising from nature, personality, society and culture,
provide the bounds within which rational action may take
place.
The broad setting of the study of man-environment
relationships, the philosophical stance of the bounded
rationality of man, and the methodology of behavioral science
make it possible to approach the long term human adjustment
to natural hazard along five lines.

Minimal understanding

of conditions upon which social policy might be based would
involve research helping to
occupance by hazard zones,

1) assess the extent of human
2) identify the full range of

possible human adjustments to the hazard,

3) study how man

perceives and estimates the occurrence of hazard,

4) describe

the process of adoption of damage-reducing adjustments in
their social context, and

5) estimate the optimal set of

adjustments in terms of anticipated social consequences.
To seek these goals we have sought to identify an
inhabitant's view of the hazard.

The attitudes of flood-plain

residents have been a primary concern and about 2,000 in-depth
interviews with residents of riverine and tidal flood plains
have been collected (see Table 2).

.

There has been a wide

adoption of behavioral science techniques, not new in
themselves, but not hitherto employed extensively in
geographical research.

These include the use of both

p~
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Table 2
Personal Interviews with Natural Hazard Zone Occupants
Location

Type of Hazard

Date

No.

Principal
Investigator(s)

Flood

1960

103

Roder (20)1

Topeka, Kansas

1960

71

Burton (20)

Hammond, Munster,
Ind.

1960

150

Burton (21)

1961

178

Kates-White
(22, 23)

Rural areas in 12
states
Tenn., Calif., I
Wise., N.Y.,
Ohio

1963

20

Burton (24)

Belleville,
Ontario

1963

38

Kates (25)

Con,necticut

1963

70

Sewell (26)

Fraser Valley,
B.C., Canada

Czamanske (27)

Ga., Ill., Pa.,

1966 1022

La., N. J . ,
Va., N. Car.

~...;r •

Coastal Storms

1964

361

Burton, Kates
Mather, Snead
(28)

East Coast of U.S.,
Maine to N.C.

Drought

1965

100

Saarinen (29)

Great Plains

Tsunami

2

1966

70

Kates-Arey

1965

249

Rooney (30)

1966

20

1966

211

Burton

3

Havighurst (41)

Massachusetts
Wy., S. Dak., Ill.
Ontario snow belt,
Canada
Oahu, Hawaii

1

Figures in parentheses refer to published
in references.

2

In process.

3

Unpublished source.

ac~ounts
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structured and unstructured interviews (20), thematic
aperception tests (29), content analysis of news media (30),
models of decision-making (31,22), benefit-cost analysis
(23, 24), and new and extended uses of probability theory
(23).

New uses have been made of traditional geographical

methods:

land-use mapping, and air-photo techniques (32,

21,28).

Extent of Human Occupance
Estimates of several kinds have been made primarily with
respect to the United States.

There are approximately 2,000

cities ln flood plains in the United States (32) and 200
communities with populations over 1,000 similarly located in
Canada (33, 26).

At least five per cent of the area of the

United States is subject to flood (2"

p. 12).

There are about

125,000 structures on the outer shore between Maine and North
Carolina less than ten feet above mean sea level (28).

A

quantity of real property approximately equivalent to the
housing stock of Boston is situated in this highly exposed
and vulnerable position.
Beyond these estimates little is known.

We are aware

of only one effort to assess the joint probability of several
hazards at one place (34).

While many more such estimates of

occupance could be made (e.g., of areas subject to a specified
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level of risk from hail, tornadoes, tsunamis, etc.), problems
of definition and doubt as to their value in relation to the
amount of effort required to make the estimate appear likely
to inhibit large-scale efforts in this direction.

For

example, a flood is sometimes said to begin when a river
overflows its banks or when rainwater ponds up in poorly
drained areas.

By another criteria, no flood occurs until

damage begins.

The delimitation of drought areas well

illustrates the illusive character of hazard as defined in
human terms.

A designation of a drought area by the Russell

formula (35) or by-the more recent Palmer index (36) assumes
that a certain duration and intensity of mOlsture deficiency
will be injurious to agriculture.

A change in the genetic

characteristics of cultivated plants or in methods of curbing
losses in soil moisture would necessarily alter the critical
limit.
Every definition of hazard requires assumptions as to
human aims and modes of adjustment.

Selection of critical

physical parameters of flood flows or drought duration is
influenced by and, in turn, influences judgement as to what
types of adjustment will be desirable.
Further work in the

del~mitation

of hazard areas and

measuring the extent of occupance would nevertheless be of
value as an aid in understanding the magnitude of the hazard.
Just how useful it can be in reducing losses is subject to
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question and the answer depends upon perception and choice
criteria to be noted •

The authors" like many others,

believe that in favorable conditions, by informing and
educating the public, it is possible to help in the
development of improved public policies.

Efforts in these

directions with respect to floods are being made by the
Tennessee Valley Authority which has published flood hazard
reports for more than 115 communities since 1950; the

u.s.

Geological Survey which has issued flood hazard maps in its
hydrologi~

atlas since 1959; and the Army Corps of Engineers

which now is embarked upon a national flood plain information
'program.

As an interim measure the Corps is compiling for

other Federal agencies a list of all towns having a
significant flood hazard.

In Ontario, flood hazard estimates.

have been made for a number of communities by the Conservation
Authorities Branch (37).
Beyond problems of definition the question of trends in
hazard-zone occupance by degrees of hazard is of special
significance.

On the outer shores of megalopolis in the

period 1940-60 a greater relative increase of structures has
occurred below mean high water than in the area above that
level (28).

An

increase in the proportion of flood damage of

a catastrophic nature has also been noted and reflects
increased occupance of the more hazardous flood plains as
well as the failure of engineering structures to contain
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extremely large

di~charges

(38).

Relative changes in

occupance of hazard zones is in part a function of the
pattern and range of human adjustment.

Range of Human Adjustment
To any given natural hazard there is a wide range of
theoretically possible adjustments.

The theoretical range

of adjustments to flood, snow and earthquake is given in
Table 3. A much more simple graphic device in common use for
public information purposes by the Tennessee Valley Authority
is reproduced as Figure 1.

It might be thought obvious that

this full range would be recognized by intelligent occupants
of a hazard area as well as by professional observers, but
that rarely happens.

We find few instances in which all the

theoretical possibilities are canvassed.
In examining these adjustments it is useful to make a
distinction between those which seek to rearrange or
manipulate nature and those which involve a rearrangement or
alteration of human behavior.

The former may be equated

with the technological approach to hazard problems, the
latter with the social or behavioral approach.

The

technological approach emphasizes the construction of dams
and levees to control floods; sinking of new and deeper wells
in periods of drought; cloud seeding to increase rainfall in
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Table 3
Theoretical Range of Adjustments to Geophysical Events
Class of
Adjustment

Earthquakes

E V E N T
Floods

Snow

Affect the
cause

No known way of
altering the
earthquake
mechanism

Reduce flood
flows by:
land-use
treatment;
cloud seeding

Change
geographical
distribution
by cloud
seeding

Modify the
hazard

Stable site
selection: soil
and slope
stabilization;
sea wave
barriers; fire
protection

Control flood
flows by:
reservoir
storage; levees;
channel
improvement;
flood fighting

Reduce impact
by snow fences;
snow removal;
salting and
sanding of
highways

Modify
loss
potential

Warning
systems;
emergency
evacuation and
preparation;
building
design; landuse change;
permanent
evacuation

Warning
systems;
emergency
evacuation and
preparation;
building
design; landuse change;
permanent
evacuation

Forecasting;
rescheduling;
inventory
control;
building
design;
seasonal
adjustments
(snow tires,
chains) ;
seasonal
migration;
designation of
snow emergency
routes

Spread the
losses

Public relief;
subsidized
insurance

Public relief;
subsidized
insurance

Public relief;
subsidized
insurance

Plan for
losses

Insurance and
reserve funds

Insurance and
reserve funds

Insurance and
reserve funds

Bear the
losses

Individual
loss bearing

Individual
loss bearing

Individual
loss bearing

Adjust to
losses:

I
I

I

I

I

I

DAMS

I
RESERVOIRS

f-

I-

I

ICORRECTIVE

FLOOD CO NTI{)L

a.

LEVEES OR WALLS

EVACUATION

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

l PREVENTIVE

f-

I-

FLOOD PLAIN REGULATIONS

ZONING ORDINANCES

REGULATIONS

r-

I SUBDIVISION

BUILDING CODES

}---

J

I

/FLOOD DAMAGE PREVENTION

I
I

~

FLOOD FORECASTING

OTHER CORRECT IVE MEASURES

MEASURES

I

~

I

HEAL TH R~GULATIONS

FLOOD PROOFI NG

-~

I

I

CHANNEL IMPROVEMENTS

J

I-

~ URBAN REDEVELOPMENT

1-

OTHERS
OTHERS

r- I
I

l

J

I

OTHER PREVENfi VE MEASURES

MEASURES

I

POll CIES

I

I

I

I

SPACES

TAX ADJU5TME'HS

I

OPEN

---t DEVELOPMENT

~

S'\JNS

I

H

FLOOD INSURANCE

I

WA~NIN'.

H

OTHERS

--l

H

I

~--------l.---------.J

I

I
I
I

I
I

I
L _________ ..l _________ -{" BLiC ItJFORMATION AlJD EDU':ArJON

I

WATERSHED TREATMENT

1912

OTHERS

AUTHORITY

1-1

VALLEy

J-I

TENNESSEE

Figure 1. Diagram of alternative measures for preventing flood losses.
This was prepared by the Local Flood
Relations Division of the Tennessee Valley Authority for use with local planning agencies.

sub-humid areas; and the buttressing of potential slide areas
in earthquake zones.

All these actions are directed to

affecting the cause of the problem or to a modification of
the hazard itself.
The social or behavioral approach emphasizes the
careful planning of flood-plain land use; more cautious use
of water and/or curtailed water use in times of drought, and
uS,e of legislative guides to encourage better building design
for earthquake resistant structures (39).

The prevailing

public approach has been to offer immediate relief and then
to turn to the technological approach.

Darns follow floods,

irrigation projects follow droughts.
The dichotomy between technological and social adjustments
is useful, but can also be misleading.

It is not intended to

imply that technological adjustments are not required, but
that they should be used cautiously and in
knowledge of their likely effects.

conjunct~on

with a

This knowledge can then

be used to call into play the appropriate social adjustments
as well.

The dichotomy is further complicated because it

coincides, to a large degree, with different allocations of
costs.

Technological solutions are commonly carried out

largely at public expense.

Social adjustments are often left

to private citizens, or their cost is. borne largely by a few
people.

There is often strong pressure, therefore, for

technological solutions because they involve a shift of the
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costs away from vociferously objecting individuals to the
society at large.

The fact that overall costs may thereby

be increased does not appear to act as a deterrent.

An

obvious conclusion is the need to place the burden of costs
for technological solutions more desirably on the shoulders
of those who benefit and/or to find ways of carrying out
social adjustments partly at public expense through the use
of subsidies, incentive payments and the like.
From the standpoint of human ecology, a recent bias
has been to encourage recognition of the possible social
and behavioral adjustments and to study the impact of
technological adjustments on human behavior and society.

We

find that when carried out in isolation without adequate
reference to social considerations, the technological
adjustments may lead to an aggravation of the problem rather
than an amelioration, as when upstream reservoir construction
encourages increased invasion of a Tennessee valley flood
plain at Chattanooga.

Commonly, the benefits received are

short run, and involve the elimination of numerous "small"
losses at the cost of greater long-term losses often of a
catastrophic nature.
Control of floods seems to induce more rapid development
of flood plains, plus a relaxation of emergency preparations.
Thus a consequence of adopting the technological fix is the'
relaxation of preparations for other, more extreme, action.

p. 15
This has been observed in both urban and rural areas (21, 32).
In some agricultural areas on large flood plains, the
severing of farm units by the construction of levees has
permitted the cultivation of more valuable crops on
unprotected land by giving farmers a more secure base for
their operations on the protected farmland.

In providing

the partial protection of levees for part of a farming
operation the technological approach also encourages a more
speculative utilization of more hazardous land.

This

"levee effect" has been observed on the flood plains of the
Mississippi and Rio Grande Rivers (21, 40).

Hazard Perception
One principal reason that public information as to
hazard has not led to rapid and solid adjustments is that
there is great difference among individuals in perception
of hazards.

It has been found useful to distinguish between

professionals (those for whom dealing with one or more
natural hazards is a professional occupation that commands
their continued attention) and non-professionals (for whom
hazards are incidental to their main pursuits).

The

perceptions of the two groups rarely correspond, but this
is not necessarily because non-professionals are simply
ignorant or stupid.

Professionals often express their ideas
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in a way which non-professionals find confusing.

For

example, non-professionals often assume that the hydrologist's
lOO-year flood occurs once every hundred years.

While such

a mistaken view may affect the choices made and the actions
taken or neglected, it also conforms to a non-professional
penchant for making events knowable and cyclical.
We find that non-professionals have a higher degree of
awareness of hazard than is commonly assumed by professionals
and that total ignorance is very rare, although the frequency
and probability of a hazardous event is often distorted from
the scientific description.

This is frequently done by

making phenomena determinate in the form of an assumed cycle
of periodicity.

On the other hand, while the professional

view incorporates stochastic probabilities comfortably, the
estimates of frequency and magnitude are not as good as they
are often assumed to be by the non-professional.

The

unreliability of professional hazard estimates can reasonably
be explained by the fact that the events themselves are often
infrequent and the period of record is short by comparison.
This results in a lack of adequate knowledge of the underlying
distribution of extreme events, and no one theory yet
commands widespread acceptance.

In this regard, professionals

often mislead non-professionals 'in much the same way and for
the same reasons that medical doctors do in their legitimate
efforts to preserve a doctor-patient relationship.
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Professionals are required to make difficult judgements but
they must maintain their client's confidence if they are to
continue to be useful.

Thus the engineer's client or the

doctor's patient usually receives a final judgement or
diagnosis that fails to convey the full range of uncertainty
that was involved.
A fundamental difference between the two groups therefore
appears to be in their tolerance of uncertainty.

We have

categorized common attitudes to the uncertainty of natural
hazards among non-professionals in Table 4.
parallels to their own attitudes to hazards.

Readers may see
Non-professional

views are shared by all who are involved with hazards in an
incidental fashion.

From this rule, we would by no means

exclude ourselves.

Adoption of Adjustments
A model of decision-making has been developed (31) which
helps to explain the adoption process.

Under this the choice

made by individuals in the face of hazard is seen as affected
not only by their perception of the hazard itself, and the
range of choice open to them, but also by their perception of
the technology which they command, the eC'onomic efficiency of
the alternatives, and their linkages with other people.
Social constraints and incentives can shape the decision.

.

Table 4
Conunon Responses to the Uncertainty of Natural Hazards

Deny or Denigrate
Its Recurrence

Deny or Denigrate

IIS even years of great

and Knowable

Making it Determinate

lilt's in the hands

to a Higher Power

Transfer Uncertainty

Eliminate the Uncertainty

Its Existence
"Lightning never

Eliminate the Hazard

"We have no floods

plenty • •

1I

taking care of it. 1I

liThe government is

of God. 1I

strikes twice in

After

here, only high

them seven years of

five years.

IIFloods come every

famine. II

the same place."

"It's a freak

water."

"It can't happen

of nature.

1I

here."

'0

I-'

co
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Empirical eVidence from personal interviews suggests
that adoption of damage-reducing adjustments bears little or
no relation to age or education.

There is a weak relationship

with previous experience that becomes most evident in areas
where very heavy damage has been sustained.

Adoptions do not

appear to be related to socio-economic status except where
the cost is high (28, p. 584, 22, p. 78).

There is a strong

relationship, however, between adoptions and frequency of
hazard and especially the perceived frequency of hazard.

A

large number of adoptions are made by a high proportion of
the population where the

probabili~y

of a hazard occurrence

is high, and where the perceived frequency is equated with
positive certainty (i.e., it will happen).

There are very

few adoptions by a small proportion of the population where
probability of a hazard occurrence is low and where the
perceived frequency is equated with negative certainty (i.e.,
it will not happen).

The most interestlng situation lies

between these extremes, where the frequency of the hazard is
intermediate and high variability of perceived frequency is
observed in the population.

Here wide variations are found

in the adoption of adjustments by people in similar
circumstances, and wide variations are also to be expected in
the proportion of population from place to place making any
particular adjustment.

These findings are graphlcally

presented in Figure 2.

The figure is not intended to imply
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a continuous distribution of responses to changing flood
frequency.

Both in urban areas and on agricultural flood

plains there appear to be discrete points of frequency at
which the human response shifts.

These occur at recurrence

intervals of 1-2 years and 4-5 years (21, 22, 25).
The full range of adjustments seems more likely to be
considered by non-professionals under conditions of positive
certainty than otherwise.

The dominant approach of many

professionals, under any level of hazard frequency is to
exhibit a strong preference for the technological fix.
This appears to stern from a strong belief on their part in
the efficacy of technology and a dis~rust of "social
engineering" or adjustments in social and behavioral

.

responses.

Technology as exemplified in the flood control

darn is seen as more dependable than social engineering with
its plan to evacuate persons and property upon receipt of a
flood warning, where the unpredictable behavior of many
people is involved.

On the other hand, there is a large

school of professionals who eschew exclusive reliance upon
technology and emphasize the subtle human adjustments to an
unmodified nature.

This was the strong theme of successive

geographic analyses of Great Plains drought ranging from
Powell's recommendations as to integrated land and water use
patterns (42), to the Great Plains Drought Committee's
proposals for readjustment in farm management plans (43).
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is scaled from total ignorance (none), through two levels of perception (perceived), to adoption
(adopted). We suggest that the variation in perception and adoption is related to flood frequency, and
even more so to perceived frequency shown hypothetically as negative and positive certainty.
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Optimal Adjustment
Although little research effort of the type reported has
focussed on the optimizing procedures developed by economists,
occasional use has been made of such methods and they are
always present as a criterion of evaluation in theoretical
terms (23).

Rational economizing approaches such as cost-

benefit analysis, program budgeting and systems analysis
appear to·be most useful where the problems are well defined
in terms of risk probability and in terms of streams of
benefits and costs.

Such techniques seem less appropriate and

less useful under the conditions of uncertainty and the
complex benefit streams commonly associated with rare and
extreme events.

Complacent optimism about the future role of

these analytical techniques is not warranted in a society
where uncertainty is of increasing significance.

Much

interest has centered, for example, on the selection of an
appropriate discount rate for reducing expected future
benefits to present value.

It appears, however, that the

results in terms of economic an~lysis from adopting the
range of discount rates now used and proposed is less than
the consequences of uncertainty in how to interpret the
hydrologic record (23).
Had the latent power of the Arno River been fully
recognized in 1956, would any different set of adjustments
have been adopted by the citizens of Florence before the
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great flood hit them ten years later?

How would they have

computed their social costs and gains, given the uncertainty
of an event that might not come for another 1000 years?
An abridged schema for human adjustment to flood is

given in Figure 3.

This is designed to show the major

choices and their outcomes available to a manager of an
industrial plant in the Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania.

The

schema also illustrates the opportunity for individual and
collective choice and for social engineering (change land
use) or for technological adjustments (protection).

The

optimal choice may normally be assumed to involve some
combination (23, 44).
When the economically optimal combination of adjustments
mixes measures that commonly are taken by individuals, as in
the case of flood proofing, with public measures, such as
levee construction or land acquisition, it is extremely
difficult to state it as a practicable alternative.

Yet such

combinations are feasible and they do exist, as on the
Golden Triangle in Pittsburgh (45).

The unified national

program for flood loss management indicates how a variety of
national policies

(highway planning, urban renewal,

mortgage financing and the like), might be articulated so as
to foster intelligent conscious choice at the local level
(2).

This was the first concerted effort by public agencies

to deal with all aspects of public action bearing on a
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Figure 3. An abridged schema of human adjustment to flood hazard.
Major choices available to a
manager of an industrial plant in the Lehigh Valley, Pa. are shown along with monetary consequences
of each choice.
The outcome with the smallest sum of costs, $97,100 (here shown as the reservoir
and emergency action combination), is most socially desirable but may not be chosen either through
ignorance of alternatives or inadequate institutional encouragement to make the choice.
Note also
the opportunity for individual and collective choice and for social-engineering (Change land-use)
versus the technological fix (Protection).
The optimum choice is usually some combination.
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single hazard.

But the means for making the necessary

comparisons still are clumsy at best.
"

On the question of why men persist in hazard areas
and continue to occupy them at an increasing rate in spite
of the sure knowledge that disasters will certainly
follow, the research offers some grounds for a preliminary
approximation.

A not entirely obvious explanation is that

men often have good reason· to be thereo

Hazard areas may

present economic opportunities superior to those available
elsewhere, at least from an individual point of view, or
to a non-professional perceiver.

In some cases, people

located in hazard areas would find it extremely difficult
to move out without help from some outside sources, or to

-

do so may require sustaining a loss, the abandoning of an
investment or a livelihood"

Even when the reasons for

being in a hazard area are not absolutely compelling (as in the
use of seacoasts for vacation homes and recreational
amenities), many people do not feel strongly threatened<
In such cases they may eliminate the hazard from their
perceptions, or reduce them to some managable and
comfortable status.
Even if people have no good reason to be in hazard zones
and do feel threatened, institutional arrangements in society
often operate to keep people in the same place and to protect
existing interests by reinforcing the status quo.

Thus,
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relief payments are commonly given to victims of disaster to
permit them to rebuild and rehabilitate only on the same
site.

Help is rarely offered to permit or induce people to

move to a less hazardous location.

Even after years of

experience in widespread relocation projects (dams,
highways, urban renewal), total evacuation never seems to
run smoothly and rarely accomplishes its ends.

Despite the

removal of the town of Valdez from_its perilous deltaic
position (the town waterfront

s~ipped

into the ocean in the

March 27, 1964 Alaska earthquake), new barge facilities have
just been built at the former location.
Continuing damages may be viewed as a natural rent
imposed upon mankind f,or the use of the earth.

Why then

should it not be recognized as a continuing charge and
budgeted for?

That would imply spreading the cost over time

and distributing it among those who decide to take the risk.
Now, costs are heavily concentrated at moments in time and
are often imposed on those least able to bear them.

One

possible strategy is the development of an all-hazard
insurance program that would be an extension of that now
being developed for floods

(46).

The paradoxical danger is

that in spreading the costs, changes in society and human
behavior may be induced which would have the long-term
effect of increasing the rent payable to nature.

The task

of spreading the rent over time and over people is therefore
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not a simple one.

The Limits of Adjustment
The foregoing findings suggest that the united States
will continue to bear a heavy burden of the effects of
natural hazards for the indefinite future and that new
strategies can be devised to change the character of losses
and to reduce this burden within definite limits.

It is

clear, for example, that loss of life can be substantially
reduced.

This has been achieved to a large extent in

North America.

It results in part from more effective

forecasts and warning devices; from a more highly mobile
population, and from more SUbstantial structures having
greater resistance to natural forces.

If some elements, at

least, of advanced Western society can be transferred to the
rest of the world, there are strong grounds for optimism in
the curbing of future loss of life.
There appear to be, however, severe limits on the
reduction of property losses from natural hazards that can
be achieved.

By a policy of the deliberate biassing of

institutional arrangements to permit flexible responses to
disasters, including specifically the possibility of
removal, by applying available and new technology, and by

.

formulating and executing plans of action to utilize
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effectively the full range of adjustments, there are grounds
for hope that future damages may be reduced by up to 30-50%
on a national scale over the next few decades and much less,
in the foreseeable future, on a global scale.

Even if this

could be done, and it will not be a simple task, the
residual damages of over 50% of potential will probably
remain.

The problem will be with us for a long time.

Critical Problems
If this line of research has aided in formulating new
public policy to deal with flood losses in the united
States, it might be worth applying to a broader range of
hazards than hitherto considered.

Extension probably would

be socially profitable into areas outside North America,
including non-western cultural areas, where different
patterns might be found and where comparisons with experience
already noted might be mutually helpful.

As this work

expands, it may be expected to bring social benefits of an
immediate kind.

In the long run it should also contribute

to the understanding of at least two sets of critical problems.
1.

Natural and other hazards.

Research to date has

concentrated heavily on floods and other geophysical hazards.
This reflects the disciplinary bias of geographers and in
hindsight seems justified because the magnitude of energy
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involved in such hazards creates a need for a wider range of
adjustments and because they are more readily isolated as
independent variables in a complex web of relationships.

It

is not yet clear to what extent insights gained in the
study of one part1cular natural hazard can be applied to
others, including the biological hazards which we have not
studiedo
syndrome

There is some evidence for a natural hazard
0

Perhaps men do respond to different natural

hazards in somewhat similar ways and in ways distinct from
responses to non-natural hazards.

How do attitudes and

decisions vary in relation to natural or non-natural hazards?
There is, for example, some indication that men develop
anxiety to a significantly greater extent in dealing with
non-natural hazards than with the natural ones that we have
mainly consideredo
To what extent do verified generalizations about
geophysical hazards obtain elsewhere?

Is the focus of this

research a separate universe of problems or is it a sub-set
of all the situations of threat and uncertainty that
confront mankind?

The d1chotomies between nature and

nurture, natural and artificial, the act of God and the
negligence of man appear to be very pervasive notions.
put the question

a~other

way, do human beings behave in

fundamentally the same way towards the uncertain
possibility of a business failure

(artificial hazard), a

To
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period of smog (quasi-natural hazard), or a flood (natural
hazard)?
This issue raises interesting speculations about the
design of social responses.

A Nationwide Natural Disaster

Warning System is being established (1), and an all
natural hazards insurance program is under discussion.

To

what extent can such responses be modelled on systems for
dealing with non-natural hazards (or vice-versa) or how do
they require modification to function effectively?
2.

Uncertainty, crisis, and technology. A provocative

relationship among uncertainty, crisis and technology emerges
from a study of the human ecology of natural hazards.
Evidence from a wide compass suggests that variability in
human behavior relative to natural hazards is a partial
function of uncertainty.

For example, greater variation in

the rate of adoption of individual adjustments is found in
those flood and drought situations where the stimulus from
the environment is more ambiguous.
Human response to hazards in the public arena has been
crisis dominated.
to be .hastily

~ade

Crisis generated decisions often appear
and may lead to policies which in turn

create a new crisis.

On the other hand, crisis does play

a positive role in stimulating action that might never be
taken in inducing society as well as individuals to
experiment with new ways of doing things.
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Occupance of hazard zones has been made more feasible and
more attractive by applications of technology, but the rising
component of -flood losses occurring in disastrous proportions
underline the increasing susceptibility of advanced societies
to catastrophes.

The Northeast blackout of 1965 suggests

that the safety of fail-safe mechanisms will be cause for
increasing concern in hazard research.

More knowledge is

clearly needed of the complex interplay of crisis, technology,
and uncertainty and of the consequences of their operation
upon man in society.
This is related to the fundamentals of the man/
environment relationship.

Extreme variations in nature may

provide a handle by which to grapple with the role of risk
and uncertainty in the affairs of men.
knowledge of the psychology of

Crucial tests of our

.
perception may

in terms of environmental hazards.

be formulated

We share with students

of international relations a concern about the role and
significance of crisis.

There is wide interest also in the

impact of scientific and technological advance on nature
and the consequences for society.

None of these issues can

yet be subjected to satisfactorily controlled investigation
and none of them can even be adequately defined in operational
terms.

We can only join forces with others working around the

periphery of these issues and pursue our studies of extreme
geophysical events in the intuitive belief that this will lead
to new insights into man and nature and the nature of man.
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